Tag Archive for: liquidated damages

$1 per day LD’s in residential building contracts no longer rules out claims by owners for general damages for delay

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Facts

In Cappello v Hammond & Simonds NSW Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 1021, Hammond & Simonds NSW Pty Ltd (Builder) entered into a standard form Housing Industry Association NSW Residential Building Contract for Works on a Cost Plus Basis (Contract) with Mr and Mrs Cappello (Owners) to renovate the ground floor of their house in Haberfield.

The LD’s for late completion was $1 per working day which was consistent with the default position under the Contract.

The works under the Contract were completed approximately 7 months late and the Builder made no requests for any extensions of time.  The Owners made various claims against the Builder, among them, was a claim for general damages for delay in the sum of $30,000.

Builder’s case

The Builder claimed that the Owners were only entitled to recover $1 per working day for delay in accordance with the LD clause in the Contract and that by making provision for LD’s in the Contract, the parties were taken to have intended to exclude a right for the Owners to also claim general damages for delay against the Builder.

Owners’ case

The Owners’ claimed that the LD clause did not provide the only remedy for the Builder’s delay because if it did, it would be void due to section 18G of the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW) (HBA) as it would have the effect of restricting the Owners’ rights in relation to the benefit of the warranty under section 18B(1)(d) of the HBA (that the work will be done with due diligence and within the time stipulated in the Contract).

What did the Supreme Court decide?

The Court found that:

  • the LD clause should not be interpreted as providing the only remedy for delay. Rather, by specifying the amount of LD’s so low at $1 per working day, instead the parties intended for the Owners to also have a right to claim general damages for delay (although in this case general damages were ultimately not awarded as the Owners did not meet the test for general damages that applies to breach of contract);
  • that an LD clause which limits a party to claiming nominal damages for a breach of a warranty restricts the rights of that person in respect of the warranty and is therefore void under section 18G of the HBA (which says that any agreement that restricts or removes the right of a person in respect of any of the statutory warranties is void); and
  • the outcome may have been different if the LD clause provided for the payment of a substantial amount in LD’s.

What does this mean for residential builders?

  • builders will be exposed in relation to existing contracts that stipulate $1 per working day (or a nominal amount for LD’s) as owners would be entitled to LD’s of $1 per working day plus general damages for delay by the builder;
  • any attempt to limit the builder’s liability for delay (including inserting a nominal amount for LD’s) will be void under section 18G of the HBA;
  • if builders wish to exclude general damages for delay in new contracts, they should insert a rate for LD’s that offers the owner a “substantial right” to compensation not just a nominal amount for breach of the statutory warranty (that the work will be done with due diligence and within the time stipulated in the contract); and
  • in order to limit the builder’s exposure for not only LD’s but also general damages for delay, builders should ensure that they claim all available EOT’s in relation to extending the contract period

Nominal liquidated damages may not keep general damages away

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A Building Contract usually contains a provision for a cap on liquidated damages. In some contracts, particularly Master Builders and HIA contracts, the amount for liquidated damages is usually a default position (unless otherwise stated) at $1 a day for each day of delay from the date the builder was meant to reach completion under the Building Contract until the builder actually completes the works.

The amount set for liquidated damages is meant to represent a genuine pre-estimate of loss that would be suffered by the principal should the works be delayed. If the amount of liquidated damages is excessive, it may be argued that such a clause is a penalty and thus be held to be void.

In the recent case of Cappello v Hammond & Simonds NSW Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 1021, the Supreme Court of NSW considered whether a Building Contract which contained a provision for a nominal amount of liquidated damages in the amount of $1 per day excluded the homeowner from also claiming general damages for delay.

The contract was a HIA Costs Plus contract for works related to renovations to a dwelling. The homeowner alleged that the builder was approximately seven months late in completing the works. The Homeowner claimed that it was entitled to general damages, in addition to the claim for the amount of liquidated damages.

The general principle in law is that where parties agree on a rate for liquidated damages, it is taken to exclude claims for general damages.

Justice Ball stated [at paragraph 27]:

“Accepting that principle, the question remains whether by inserting a nominal amount as the amount payable by way of liquidated damages the parties intended, in effect, to exclude the operation of the liquidated damages clause or whether they intended to exclude a right to claim damages for delay altogether. The answer to that question does not depend on the application of any general principle but on the proper construction of the contract in question.” (Emphasis added)

It was also noted that Section 18B(1)(d) of the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW) implies into a residential Building Contract a warranty that the builder will complete the works within the time stipulated in the Building Contract. If the Building Contract seeks to limit a party from claiming damages in the form of nominal liquidated damages it has the effect of restricting that party’s rights in respect of the warranty and would be held to be void under Section 18G of the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW).

Justice Ball held that he preferred the interpretation that if only a nominal amount of liquidated damages is provided for under a Building Contract, it should not be interpreted as preventing a claim for general damages. Accordingly, the parties intend that general damages can be claimed rather than limiting it to the amount of the nominal amount of liquidated damages.

However, Justice Ball ultimately upheld in this case that the Home Owner was only entitled to nominal damages as the majority of the delays were due to the Homeowner’s requested variations to the works and did not appear to have suffered any additional loss.

In light of the above, it is important for liquidated damages to represent a genuine pre-estimate of loss, otherwise:

  1. it will either be held to be a penalty if it is too high and thus void; or
  2. if the amount of liquidated damages is only nominal, then it can be also be held to be either void or may not exclude general damages.

If you or someone you may know is in need of assistance or clarification regarding the above, please email us at info@bradburylegal.com.au or call (02) 9248 3450.

Case article – Brolton Group Pty Ltd v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd

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In Brolton Group Pty Ltd v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 63 (Brolton), the NSW Court of Appeal considered the jurisdictional and procedural fairness grounds of an adjudicator’s determination.

Background

Brolton was contracted by Hanson to build a quarry processing plant at Bass Point. The parties agreed on a guaranteed maximum price of $85 million (excluding GST) in which Brolton was entitled to claim monthly progress payments on the last Tuesday of each month. Hanson claimed liquidated damages and the contract was eventually terminated on 3 October 2018. In August 2019, Brolton served a payment claim on Hanson. The payment claim claimed work up to September 2018 as well as interest on unpaid amounts to August 2019. The adjudicator determined in favour of Brolton, issuing an adjudication amount of $2,877,052.75. Hanson challenged the decision in the Supreme Court, with the Supreme Court finding in favour of Hanson. This resulted in the appeal by Brolton to the NSW Court of Appeal.

The Court’s decision

Brolton raised two main grounds of appeal. The first and most pertinent issue, concerning jurisdiction, centred predominantly on the availability of a reference date on which Brolton could make its payment claim.
Importance of jurisdiction and the trouble of jurisdictional error
Under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) (SOP Act) section 22, an adjudicator is given the statutory authority to determine the amount of a progress payment, the date on which such amount became payable and the rate of interest payable on any such amount. The importance of section 22 is that it sets out the jurisdiction of an adjudicator. As the saying goes, with great power comes great responsibility. While the adjudicator is given the power to make these determinations, section 22 sets out the limited factors that the adjudicator can consider. These are the responsibility components of the adjudicator’s determination. Two of the relevant factors to consider in Brolton was the provisions of the SOP Act and the payment claim.
While adjudicators are given the power to make determinations, they can only do so in certain circumstances or if there are specified preconditions. In the legal world, this is called a ‘jurisdictional fact’. As Gleeson JA described in Brolton (at paragraph 28), the term jurisdictional fact is used to describe ‘any precondition which a statute requires to exist in order for the decision-maker to embark on the decision-making process’. Jurisdictional facts fall into two types:

1. The existence of an identified state of affairs; or
2. A state of satisfaction of the decision-maker as to an identified state of affairs.

A jurisdictional fact gives a decision-maker the power to make the decision. If it exists, then an adjudicator can make a determination. In this way, the reference date activates the adjudicators powers to make a determination under the SOP Act.
Under the SOP Act, a claimant is only able to make a payment claim when there is a reference date under the construction contract. Therefore, the existence of a reference date is a jurisdictional fact that falls into the first category. This is because the existence or non-existence of a reference date is objective and does not depend on whether the adjudicator is satisfied that a reference date exists. Where an adjudicator exercises its power, but the jurisdictional fact does not actually exist, the adjudicator has made a jurisdictional error..
Getting back to the case, in submitting its payment claim, Brolton claimed in its adjudication submissions that the reference dates for August 2018 and September 2018 were available for the payment claim. Hanson also contended that the September 2018 reference date was available for the progress payment. However, the adjudicator ‘went rogue’ and determined that the reference date was in fact 23 October 2018. There were a few issues with this. Firstly, the 23 October 2018 was not the last Tuesday of the month (which in fact was 30 October 2018). Secondly, the contract had been terminated on 3 October 2018, meaning no further reference dates arose. As the clause entitling Brolton to a progress payment did not continue beyond the termination of the contract, the adjudicator had made a jurisdictional error. The reference date the adjudicator relied on did not exist, and therefore the determination was void and the $2.8 million decision was overturned (as if it had never been made).

Although Hanson succeeded on the first issue, the Court was still minded to consider the second issue on appeal. The second issue concerned the procedural fairness of the adjudicator’s decision. Like jurisdiction, procedural fairness is a legal term that has important consequences for adjudication determinations. Procedural fairness is an aspect of natural justice, a foundational legal principal that sets the standards of how people are to exercise their authority. The concept of procedural fairness means the process in which a decision is made should be just. Procedural fairness requires that parties have the right or opportunity to have their case heard by the decision-maker. If there is a substantial denial of natural justice, the decision-maker’s determination will be void. In this case, the issue of procedural fairness arose because the adjudicator determined that the relevant reference date was a date not submitted by either party. Brolton argued that while procedural fairness was denied to the parties, it was immaterial and should not void the adjudicator’s decision. The Court found that the findings by the adjudicator were a material breach of procedural fairness and therefore there was a breach of natural justice.

Take-away points

While this article has discussed a few technical legal concepts, the main take away points from Brolton are that:
• A progress payment must be linked to a specific reference date. If an adjudicator incorrectly attributes a payment claim to a reference date which does not exist, the determination will be void.
• It is not enough that another reference date is available for the payment claim to be linked to. If the adjudicator goes rogue and determines a reference date not submitted by the parties, the decision will be void.
• Claimants should identify and make it abundantly clear the relevant reference date to which a payment claim relates and make submissions in the adjudication application as to what the relevant reference date is.
• Reference dates are essential for an adjudicator to make a determination. A failure by the adjudicator to appropriately determine a reference date can have dire consequences to claimants.
• Note: The recent amendments to the NSW SOP Act have eliminated the post-termination payment claim issue. Section 13(1C) now states that for construction contracts that have been terminated, a payment claim may be served on and from the date of termination. This change will only apply to contracts entered into after 21 October 2019.

Corona virus and force majeure in construction contracts: Has your contract been immunised

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While many were recovering from New Years’ celebrations, corona virus was starting to make its way into the headlines. For the last 2 months, corona virus has dominated the news with many people and businesses starting to feel its impact as borders are shut down and quarantines are imposed. At the time of writing, the World Health Organisation has reported that corona virus has spread to many parts of the world including Australia, North America and parts of Europe. With much of the corona outbreak concentrated to China, several businesses are starting to feel the economic impact. As the manufacturing hub of the world, China is responsible for much of the world’s imports. Further, as the corona virus spreads and causes further border shutdowns, it becomes harder for businesses to have certainty in knowing when they will be able to import or export their goods. With businesses having to meet their contractual deadlines, the uncertainty can create a real issue for some. Consequently, many businesses may be put into a position where they are unable perform their contractual obligations. This article focuses on the different ways a construction contract may deal with situations such as corona virus.

The clause typically suited to situations or events like the outbreak of corona virus is a force majeure clause. Force majeure means ‘superior force’ and commonly covers natural events such as earthquakes or unforeseeable and disruptive manmade events such as war and industrial strikes. In the Australian context, force majeure clauses are creatures of the contract. This means that they only exist by virtue of a contractual provision which allocates the risk between the parties. Further, Australian courts will interpret these clauses strictly, giving the clauses the minimum application available within the ordinary meaning of the provision. In the construction contract context, it is unusual to see a specific force majeure clause. By way of illustration, the Australian Standard contracts do not contain a standard force majeure clause. Therefore, it is up to the parties to amend and insert a specific force majeure provision into the contract if they wish to have a specific mechanism dealing with the risk arising from these types of events.

As many readers may be aware, at the core of construction contracts is the allocation of risk through program. Therefore, construction contracts may, by their very essence, be differentiated from non—construction contracts. For example, extension of time (EOT), delay costs and liquidated damages clauses assign time related risks between the parties. The definitions of qualifying causes of delay and compensable causes in the Australian Standard provide a mechanism to pass time and cost related risks from contractors or subcontractors to the developer or head contractor. Amending the definition of qualifying causes of delay to extend to force majeure events is one way a construction contract can account for circumstances such as the corona virus. The key difference between allowing relief through a force majeure clause and allowing an EOT for force majeure events is that an EOT provides a contractor or subcontractor protection against liquidated damages. This is differentiated from a force majeure clause which may generally limit a party’s liability under the contract.

Irrespective of the way force majeure events are incorporated into construction contracts, care must be taken in drafting these clauses. When getting into the force majeure territory, contractors and subcontractors need to make sure that the definition of ‘force majeure’ or ‘force majeure event’ is drafted clearly, but not too broadly. For example, stating that a subcontractor is entitled to an EOT for anything outside of their control may be clear, but too broad to specifically cover corona virus. However, stating that the subcontractor is entitled to an EOT for delays related to the corona virus may be clearly drafted, but it does not provide much further scope. The clause would not protect from outbreaks or re-emergence of SARS or other endemics, epidemics or pandemics. A balance must be reached between these two extremes and will depend on the specific project.

When drafting a force majeure clause, it is important to consider some broad points. Firstly, force majeure clauses are usually exhaustive in nature, meaning that only what is in the contract is covered. Secondly, the party affected by the force majeure event must not have caused or contributed to the event and will required to take all steps to overcome or mitigate its effects. There also needs to be a connection between the force majeure event and the performance of the contractual obligations. For instance, the mere occurrence of the corona virus is not sufficient to justify an EOT in all cases. It will only entitle relief from liquidated damages when the event has caused a delay. By including these conditions, a force majeure clause (whether in EOT form or specific clause form) will generally entitle a party to relief or suspension of their obligations under the contract.

A significant problem with force majeure events is that it can be difficult for parties to establish that they should be entitled to relief under the clause. For example, in relation to the mitigation element discussed above, a party is often required to show that it cannot fulfil its supply obligations. While a party may have its preferred third party supplier, the mere fact that supply is not available from this supplier will not justify force majeure relief. The parties are bound by their contractual deal and this remains the case even if the obligations become significantly more onerous or expensive to complete. However, if all of the supply of product X is unavailable, then a party should be entitled to relief under the relevant clause until the supply becomes available again.

If you or someone you may know is in need of advice on existing contracts or advice regarding the force majeure clause, please contact our office by phoning (02) 9248 3450 or by email at info@bradburylegal.com.au.

ADR Processes

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ADR Processes: What are they and how do they work?

 

In many construction contracts, it is common to have a clause that deals with the process the parties will go through if a dispute arises. These clauses attempt to provide an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process to litigating over every dispute that arises. While there are some disputes that are suited to being litigated (such as where a specific legal remedy is needed, the subject matter involves the legal rights of the parties or the issues are legally complex), many can be resolved through an ADR processes. ADR processes, if effective, can reduce the time and cost of disputes for parties.

 

This article discusses the different types of ADR processes and Part II will address some of the common pitfalls of ADR clauses that render these clauses unenforceable.

 

Types of ADR processes:

 

When it comes to construction disputes, there are several standard types of ADR processes. These include:

 

  • Negotiations between senior executives or authorised representatives;
  • Mediation;
  • Arbitration; and
  • Expert determination and appraisal.

 

Negotiations

 

Negotiation between senior executives is the most simple and informal dispute resolution process. The senior executives or authorised representatives meet and discuss the dispute that has arisen. Using their best endeavours, the authorised representatives can talk about how the dispute may be resolved and attempt and find any potential compromises. While the discussions may not necessarily resolve the dispute, it gives the parties a chance to hear the other side and understand the issues faced by the other party. This can help narrow the issues that are in dispute between the parties, saving significant time and money if the dispute escalates to litigation.

 

Mediation

 

The next step in the ADR ladder is mediation. Mediation is slightly more formal than negotiations between the parties’ authorised or senior representatives. This is because mediation involves appointing a third party (the mediator) to meet with the parties and work to resolve the dispute. The mediator will discuss the positions and interests of each party and try to find common ground on which the parties can agree and tries to help facilitate a resolution of the dispute.

 

One of the biggest benefits of mediation is the fact that it is so flexible in the resolutions that can be generated in response to a dispute. For instance, parties can find creative or unorthodox solutions to their problems which would not be available if the dispute were to be litigated. At mediation, the parties have the control over the resolution of the dispute and can work together to create a solution that is potentially more appropriate than a court order.

Arbitration

 

Arbitration is a common dispute resolution process in the building industry. Between commercial parties, arbitration can be an effective alternative to court because it operates much like a Court. The Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW) sets out the various matters relating to domestic commercial arbitrations including the arbitrator’s powers and the appeal process. The decisions of arbitrators are binding and the resulting awards can be enforced by the Courts.

 

Arbitrations can sometimes be as expensive and time consuming as litigation. This is because of several factors such as the cost of hiring an arbitrator and decisions are often appealed. However, some of the benefits of choosing arbitration include that it can be confidential and allows the parties to have more control over the rules and procedures that resolve the dispute. Subject to any overriding arbitration legislation or rules, the parties can essentially decide how they want the determination to run, how many arbitrators they want involved or any grounds of appeal.

 

Expert Determination

 

Another ADR process discussed in this article is expert determination. Expert determination can be binding, or non-binding (dependent on the rules of the particular expert agreement or contract that sends the parties in dispute into that forum). Unlike arbitration, there is no statutory framework for expert determination or appraisal. Therefore, it is the contract that will guide the expert and their decision. Using an expert to make a final and binding decision is useful, as the majority (if not all) building disputes will rely on expert evidence to determine issues such as program, defects or rectification costs.

 

Using non-binding expert determination can prevent or reduce the need for a court to consider these technical issues and can simplify the litigation process. A potential drawback for expert determination is that it can be very difficult to challenge. Provided the expert has understood the scope of their obligations and the issues they need to review, it often will not matter if the expert made a mistake, a gross over or under valuing or if irrelevant considerations were considered. As stated by the NSW Supreme Court in TX Australia Pty Limited v Broadcast Australia Pty Limited [2012], the fundamental question is whether the exercise performed by the expert in fact satisfies the terms of the contract.

 

It is not uncommon for a dispute resolution clause to have multiple different ADR processes available to the parties. For example, parties may be required to enter negotiations with each other and then must proceed to mediation or arbitration. Therefore, it is important to understand the aspects of each different ADR process so that you can choose the one most appropriate for your business. Each ADR process has its benefits and its drawbacks and will be more effective for certain types of disputes. In the Part II of this article, we will look at dome of the common pitfalls of ADR clauses. Particularly, how you ensure that the clause is enforceable, the key aspects of the ADR clause, and what are the common issues that arise when negotiating an ADR clause.

The Parties’ Minds over Matter: terminated contract versus quantum meruit

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The High Court of Australia has recently handed down a rare and significant judgment in the area of building and construction law.
A story that began with the construction of two townhouses in Victoria has led to the shaking of the foundations of the law around contract, repudiation and claiming a quantum meruit.
This decision affects the common situation in which a builder and a developer have a torn-up contract, and the builder is claiming payment for the work they started but were not able to finish.
We explore Mann v Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] HCA 32 below and provide an overview of the key takeaways from this ruling in relation to quantum meruit.
The High Court also considered some interpretation issues in relation to the Victorian Domestic Building Contract Act 1995. These are not considered here.

Quantum meruit

Before analysing the case, it is useful to outline what is a claim for quantum meruit.
A claim for quantum meruit, is a claim for a fair and reasonable sum for services rendered, where a developer requests and receives a benefit from a builder.
This is not a claim in contract, which is a claim by Party A to be given that which Party B promised or agreed to give.

Where a contract is still alive between the parties, a claim for quantum meruit is not permitted. Some of the situations in which a claim in quantum meruit may be brought include:
(a) a contract never existed between the parties;
(b) statute prevents a claim in contract, because for example the agreement was for residential building work but it was not in writing; or
(c) a contract was in existence but was void or unenforceable.

Case (c) above was the subject of Mann v Paterson Constructions. In this case, the contract was terminated, so it no longer applied between the parties.
An issue that has been plaguing courts for some time is the following: in a claim for quantum meruit, what if a “fair and reasonable sum” for services performed is greater than what the parties agreed to under the contract? Should the claim be limited to what was agreed to by the parties, even if that agreement was ripped up?
It was an inevitable prize fight between contract and quantum meruit, with a purse of several hundred thousand dollars at stake.

The facts

On 4 March 2014, Peter and Angela Mann (the Manns) entered into a Masters Builders Association domestic building contract (Contract) with Paterson Constructions Pty Ltd (Paterson). Under the Contract, Paterson was to build two double-storey townhouses in Blackburn, Victoria. The Manns were to pay Paterson the amount of $970,000 (incl. GST). During the performance of the Contract, the Manns requested 42 variations without giving the required written notice. Paterson performed these variations.
On 16 April 2015, a little over one year into the project, the relationship between the parties had deteriorated, primarily over claims that variations had been completed and had to be paid.
The Manns through their solicitors wrote to Paterson, stating that they considered the contract to have been repudiated by Paterson. Repudiation occurs where a party demonstrates that it is unwilling or unable to perform important parts of the contract. The Manns “accepted” this repudiation and said that they terminated the Contract.
Paterson denied that its conduct had been repudiatory. After some correspondence, Paterson claimed that the Manns’ purported termination was in fact repudiation by the Manns. Paterson said that as a result, it terminated the Contract.

The case history: from VCAT to the High Court
Paterson commenced proceedings in the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, seeking damages.
Senior Member Walker of VCAT found that the Manns had wrongfully repudiated the contract. Paterson was awarded damages on a quantum meruit. Once rectification of defects was considered, damages were $660,526.41.
The remarkable aspect of the ruling was that the damages awarded to Patterson for quantum meruit were much higher than the contract price that Paterson would have been entitled to had the Contract remained alive. Senior Member Walker was acutely aware of this, but considered the damages to be a fair and reasonable sum.
The Manns appealed first to the Supreme Court of Victoria, however Cavanough J dismissed the appeal. The Manns then appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The Manns argued that the decision-makers had made an error. They argued that the error was that the decision-makers had decided that where a contract is terminated, it is as though it never existed and, as a result, they did not have to consider the costs actually incurred by the builder carrying out the work or the discrepancy between the amount awarded and the contract price.
The Court of Appeal also dismissed this appeal, ruling that only the High Court could overturn a principle that was said to be well-established. Not to be swayed, the Manns embarked on this challenged and took their case to the High Court.

The High Court judgment

All seven judges allowed the appeal. After two unsuccessful appeals, the third and last appeal by the Manns was a success.
The seven judges accepted that the law as currently interpreted had to be corrected.
Three judges refused to allow a claim on a quantum meruit where a contract between the parties had been terminated.
The four other judges accepted that a claim for quantum meruit could be made in limited circumstances: where work was commenced but not completed at the time of termination. However, any claim for quantum meruit was limited by the contract price that was agreed to by the parties.
Where the contract required the principal to pay only once for the “entire” work and labour performed by the contractor, and the contract is terminated before completion, then the contractor will be able to claim for all of the work it completed on a quantum meruit. This is because at the time of termination, the contractor had not yet accrued the contractual “right” to be paid – it had not completed all of the work.
However, the situation was different for the case of the Manns. Under their Contract, the principal was required to pay separate sums upon completion of certain stages of the work and labour. Paterson had fully completed some of these stages, while there was at least one stage which remained incomplete at the time of termination.
The majority decided that for completed stages, these could only be claimed under the contract, and damages would be assessed by reference to the contract price. It was only the incomplete stage that could be claimed on a quantum meruit.
The other important finding by the majority was that the amount to be claimed on a quantum meruit should not in the ordinary case exceed a fair value calculated in accordance with the contract price. This judgment left open the possibility of exceptions, including for example where constant breaches by a principal resulted in a huge cost overrun by the builder.
The Court was at pains to point out that, where a contract is still alive between the parties, parties cannot claim on a quantum meruit for a reasonable sum for the services rendered. The parties made an agreement that is still enforceable. That is all that courts will enforce.
What the decision did not resolve was the common case where a contract provides for progress payments, which are made on account only and are not final entitlements. This issue might be before the superior courts before long.
Conclusion

In some very complicated and differing judgments, the High Court has given a lot of clarity to an issue that has clouded the minds of lawyers, tribunal members and judges alike.
Builders and developers should be aware that even if there is no contract, where work is requested by developer and completed by a contractor, there will be a good case for a claim for damages.
Where a contract existed between parties at some point, this will be a significant factor in calculating the amount of damages, even where it is terminated.
If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice, please contact us on +61 2 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au

Expertly building evidence: Lessons learned from White Constructions

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Case note: White Constructions Pty Ltd v PBS Holdings Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1166

In White Constructions, Hammerschlag J considered the issue of delay damages. White Constructions was the property developer of a site in Kiama NSW. The development involved the development and subdivision of 100 lots and required design and installation of sewer infrastructure. These works required a s 73 Certificate issued by Sydney Water before subdivision could occur. White Constructions appointed the Defendants to assist with the design and approval works needed as part of the development and resulting subdivision. A substantial part of the judgment was devoted to the preparing and designing of the sewer designs and the approval of Sydney Water, including the different types of sewage systems, Sydney Water’s preference in relation to these systems, preparation of option reports and correspondence between the Superintendent, the Defendants and Sydney Water.

The discussions between Sydney Water, the Superintendent and the Defendants took considerable time. As a result, White Constructions alleged that the delay in coming to the approved sewage design caused White Constructions to be liable to their building contractor for delay damages. In arguing the substance of the dispute, the parties tendered complex expert evidence. As a result, the Court appointed an expert to assist in interpreting and assessing the expert evidence presented.

With the expert’s assistance, Hammerschlag J criticised the experts’ approach to determining the delays attributable to the sewage works. Both experts used methods derived from the United Kingdom Society of Construction Law, the Delay and Disruption Protocol (the Protocol) in analysing the delay. The Protocol identifies six different methods of delay analysis, but Hammerschlag J held that the inclusion of a delay analysis method in the Protocol does not necessarily mean it should be used. While the Protocol methods have been endorsed in other cases, the analysis of delay must pay close attention to the actual evidence of what was happening on the ground of the project. The delay analysis must show and prove that, on the balance of probabilities, the delay:
• played a role in delaying the project;
• how it delayed the project; and
• how much it delayed the project.

This approach is in line with the common law common-sense approach to causation which the High Court referred to in March v E&MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506.

A lot of value in White Constructions comes from Hammerschlag J’s analysis of what evidence is needed in cases where delay is alleged in construction matters. Firstly, the Court stated that close attention must be paid to the facts of the matter, rather than the opinion of experts. This evidence should not be general in nature, but specific in that it is able to precisely identify delays in the project. This evidence should be a contemporaneous record of the project. A classic example of this kind of evidence is a site diary which records the day to day of the project, as well as specific cause and effect of each delay.
• what works were undertaken/completed;
• the instructions received from the client;
• the delays/any complaints of delays and how they have affected other activities;
• which personnel were onsite; and
• any other relevant details

The Court found that it was important that the contemporaneous record identified which activities were adversely affected by the delays. For example, if the works of one contractor were delayed and, as a result, caused delay for another contractor, the site diary should record these details. Failing to record these details means that it is harder, if not near impossible, for parties to establish that there was in fact a causal link and adverse effect.

How does White Constructions impact a project?

White Constructions shows the importance of proper project documentation. Most importantly, the site diary, or similar contemporaneous document, should be the primary record of the specific of what is happening on site and how specific events affect different contractors. Proper record keeping, while it may be administratively burdensome, allows the Court to analyse and determine the proper entitlements of the parties if the project ever comes into dispute. While other evidence can be adduced in pursuit of proving delay, it runs the risk of being generalist in nature and not enough to prove the causal link of the delays.

The lessons learned in White Constructions may also have some application in respect of other delay related mechanisms under construction contracts. For example, a comprehensive site diary would also be useful in determining any claim for an EOT claim. However, it is important to note that these types of claims are largely determined by the contract and its processes for determining what is in fact an EOT. Nevertheless, contemporaneous records of what has happened and how this has affected the project is useful in establishing a claim by a party as to their entitlements.
Another important point that comes from White Constructions is ensuring experts are given the proper lay evidence to ensure that they can properly opine on the project. While it does not displace the role of lay evidence such as site diaries, it can assist in assisting the Court in considering and making appropriate decisions on what the parties are entitled to.

If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice, please contact us on +61 2 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au.

Changes coming in October 2019

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As we have covered in a previous article (see here), 2019 is the year of change for NSW’s security of payment legislation. In November 2018, the NSW Government passed the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Amendment Act 2018, which introduces significant amendments to the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (Act).

In July 2019 it was confirmed that these amendments would commence on 21 October 2019 (rather than in stages as previously speculated) and apply to prospectively to construction contracts entered in into after that date.

A more in-depth explanation of the amendments can be found in our previous article but as a refresher the key amendments to the Act are:

  • Officers from the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation have new powers to investigate, monitor and enforce compliance with the Act;
  • The concept of executive liability has been introduced, exposing directors and management to prosecution if a corporation commits an offence under the Act;
  • Tougher maximum penalties apply, especially in regards to failing to provide a supporting statement;
  • Jurisdictional errors made by adjudicators are reviewable by the Supreme Court (this confirms previous decisions of the courts);
  • Companies in liquidation can no longer serve a payment claim or seek to enforce them;
  • The reference date concept has been removed;
  • Payment claims must again state that they are made under the Act;
  • The due date for payment to subcontractors has been reduced to 20 business days (from 30 business days);
  • Residential owner-occupier exemptions in the Act have been removed; and
  • The threshold for retention moneys that must be held in a trust account has been reduced to $10 million.

What this means for you

As can be seen from the above, these new amendments are significant and wide ranging.  Parties involved in the NSW construction industry have just over one month to consider how these amendments will effect their business and construction contracts before they commence on 21 October 2019.

If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice in relation to NSW’s security of payment legislation, please contact us on +61 (02) 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au.

Security of payment: no work, no pay

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Participants in the commercial building industry generally rely on security of payment legislation to resolve payment disputes. As a preliminary means of recovering money under a construction contract, those in the industry are usually keen to hear of developments regarding a court’s interpretation of the legislative provisions.

Shape Australia Pty Ltd v The Nuance Group (Australia) Pty Ltd [2018] VSC 808 (‘Shape’ and ‘Nuance Group’) recently considered two issues under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2002 (Vic) (the ‘Act’), namely:

  • whether a reference date can be ‘refreshed’ for a payment claim when there has been no further work carried out since the previous reference date; and
  • whether an amount in a payment claim which attempts to recoup liquidated damages (previously offset in a payment schedule) constitutes an ‘excluded amount’ under the Act.

Background

In July 2016, Shape and Nuance Group entered a contract for the demolition and associated works at Melbourne International Airport.

On 2 March 2018, Shape issued payment claim #13 for $3,533,233.84. Nuance Group responded with a payment schedule stating the amount payable as nil. Shape applied for adjudication for a reduced sum of $2,243,105.55.

On 13 April 2018, a First Adjudication Determination for the sum of $1,400,007.12 issued, which after review instigated by Nuance Group, was reduced to $1,216,715.72.

Nuance Group challenged the validity of the original and reviewed determinations and, on 2 June 2018, in Nuance Group (Australia) Pty Limited v Shape Australia Pty Limited [2018] VSC 362 the Court quashed the determination on the basis that the adjudicator had “failed to perform his basic and essential function” under the Act.

Subsequently:

  • On 10 July 2018, Shape issued payment claim #14 for $1,285,579.62 which included “uncontested individual line items claimed in payment claim #13”. Nuance Group responded with a payment schedule stating the amount payable as nil.
  • Shape applied for adjudication, and on 23 August 2018, a Second Adjudication Determination issued which essentially declared the claim invalid for want of a valid reference date and that (in any event) the amount payable was nil on the basis that the claim was for an excluded amount.
  • Shape applied for orders remitting the first or second adjudication determination for review.

Decision

Was the payment claim invalid for want of a reference date?

Section 9(1) of the Act provides that there must be a valid reference date to avail rights for a person to a progress payment. A payment claim must be supported by a valid reference date, which is a precondition to an adjudicator making a determination under the Act.

Clause 42.1 of the construction contract entitled Shape to make payment claims on the 28th day of each month, and that such claims should include “the value of work carried out by the contractor in the performance of the contract to that time …”. On that basis, the Court considered that the requirement for work to be carried out “to that time” established a threshold for making a claim.

Payment claim 14, which had a reference date of 28 June 2018, was identical to payment claim 13, which carried a reference date of 28 February 2018. No further work had been carried out since issuing payment claim 13 and accordingly, 28 February was the last available reference date under the contract.

It followed that payment claim 14 was invalid for “want of a reference date”. The claim was either made in respect of the (same) 28 February reference date and therefore in breach of the Act, or a claim served out of time, namely, outside of the three-month period prescribed by the Act.

Shape’s application was dismissed, the Court agreeing with the adjudicator’s determination and finding nothing further to conclude otherwise.

Are liquidated damages an excluded amount?

The Act sets out certain classes of amounts that are “excluded” and must not be taken into account when calculating an amount of a progress payment. Essentially, excluded amounts include certain variations of the construction contract, amounts claimed for compensation due to the “happening of an event” (latent conditions, time-related costs and changes in regulations), amounts claimed for damages in relation, or incidental to, a breach under the construction contract or other claims arising at law.

The concept of an excluded amount in the Victorian Act underpins a key objective, namely, to facilitate cashflow within the industry by dealing with payment disputes promptly, whilst maintaining the parties’ legal rights to argue more complex issues later.

The Second Adjudication Determination declared the amount payable in the claim as nil on the basis that “…the entirety of the purported claim was for an excluded amount, being an attempt to recoup the first defendant’s asserted entitlement to liquidated damages”.

The Court confirmed this decision, reiterating the adjudicator’s findings that:

  • when the individual items listed in payment claim 14 were “adjusted and reconciled” the total equated “to the amount of Nuance Group’s asserted entitlement to liquidated damages”; and
  • the amount claimed could be “explained on no other basis, given no new work had been performed and the other claims in payment claim 14 [had] been satisfied”.

Takeaways

Seabay Properties Pty Ltd v Galvin Construction Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 183 determined that a set-off claimed in a payment schedule (by way of a deduction in response to a payment claim) constitutes liquidated damages and is therefore, an excluded amount for the purposes of the Act.

The present case however confirmed that an attempt to recoup liquidated damages through a payment claim will also constitute an excluded amount.

Industry participants should take note that:

  • Liquidated damages claimed as an offset in a payment schedule as well as amounts claimed in a payment claim to recoup liquidated damages are excluded amounts for the purposes of the Victorian security of payment legislation.
  • Claimants wishing to dispute liquidated damages should do so at the time they are levied. Where offsets have previously been raised in a payment schedule and the corresponding payment claim settled, a challenge to these levies in a subsequent payment claim will likely be considered an excluded amount.
  • If the right to make a payment claim under a construction contract is subject to the carrying out of work ‘up to the time’ for making the claim, there will be no available reference date unless work has been carried out since the last reference date.

If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice, please contact us on +612 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au.