Tag Archive for: Security of Payment

A Downer of a decision: The importance of articulating adjudication submissions

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In Diona Pty Ltd v Downer EDI Works Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 480 (Diona), the Supreme Court considered an application to set aside an Adjudicator’s Determination for failure to consider the terms of the contract as required by s 22(2)(b) of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (the SOP Act).

Key takeaway:

  • It is important to ensure that adjudication submissions clearly articulate all relevant arguments and contractual provisions. Unclear, poorly framed or ambiguous submissions can be costly.
  • An adjudicator’s decision will not be declared void simply because it contains what one party considers to be an error or failure by the adjudicator to expressly address all arguments made in parties’ submissions.
  • Lawyers can be useful to assist in preparing an adjudication application and response. Having prepared and responded to numerous security of payment claims, the lawyers at Bradbury Legal are experts at ensuring your arguments are clearly articulated.

 

Background

Diona Pty Ltd (Diona) entered into a subcontract with Downer EDI Works Pty Ltd (Downer), for Downer to provide works in relation to safety upgrades on the Great Western Highway, Blackheath. Downer proceeded to adjudication on a payment claim under the SOP Act. On 16 April 2020, the relevant Adjudicator determined that Downer was entitled to a progress payment of $430,990.13 (Determination).

Diona made an application to the Supreme Court, seeking a declaration that the Determination was void and an injunction preventing Downer from requesting an adjudication certificate or filing the adjudication certificate as a judgment debt. Diona contended that the Adjudicator had incorrectly awarded a set off claim by Downer, in response to Diona’s liquidated damages claim, in the amount of $30,000 on account of two extension of time claims (EOT Claims).

Diona argued that the Adjudicator had not fulfilled the requirements of s 22(2)(b) of the SOP Act because the Adjudicator had failed to give any reference to, or consideration of, Diona’s contention in its adjudication response submissions that Downer was not entitled to these extensions of time, due to the operation of a time bar in the contract.

 

Did the Adjudicator consider the time bars?

The central question was whether the Adjudicator considered the provisions of the contract. Under section 22(2)(b) SOP Act, an adjudicator must consider the provisions of the construction contract.

To determine if the Adjudicator did consider the contractual provisions, especially those containing the time bar, the Court looked at the submissions made by both parties and the Adjudicator’s determination.

The Court noted that Downer had ‘devoted a number of pages to its contentions concerning extension of time and, in particular, its asserted entitlement to EOT 18 and EOT 21’. This was contrasted with Diona’s submissions, the Court found did not properly engage with Downer’s EOT Claims. Diona’s submissions stated:

‘Determinations of claims for…extension of time…by Diona are final and cannot be disturbed except by raising a Claim under the Contract, see relevant clauses of the Subcontract.’

The Court highlighted a part of the Adjudicator’s reasons which stated:

‘The Act at section 22(2)(b) requires the adjudicator to consider the provisions of the construction contract when making the determination’

Having regard to the Adjudicator’s express reference to s 22(2)(b) of the SOP Act, the Court stated that there were several reasons why the Adjudicator did not refer to the dispute clause in the Determination. Firstly, the Adjudicator may have felt that Diona did not properly articulate and develop the time bar argument. Alternatively, the Adjudicator may have misunderstood the submissions. The Court concluded that:

‘The Adjudicator may have come to the wrong decision about Dower’s entitlement to EOT 18 and EOT 21. But that, without more, is not a basis to set aside the set aside the determination.’

The argument that Diona sought to raise, while potentially valid, was not properly articulated. Therefore, it could not be inferred that the Adjudicator had failed to consider the provisions of the subcontract as required by s 22(2)(b) of the SOP Act.

 

So what?

The significance of this case is that it shows that what appear to be errors or failures to consider an argument by an adjudicator will not always result in a basis to set aside the adjudicator’s determination. The adjudicator’s decision can be rough and ready, provided the adjudicator makes their decision in accordance with the SOP Act. Payments made under SOP Act are on account only and may be determined on a final basis at a later stage.

 

Case article – Brolton Group Pty Ltd v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd

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In Brolton Group Pty Ltd v Hanson Construction Materials Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 63 (Brolton), the NSW Court of Appeal considered the jurisdictional and procedural fairness grounds of an adjudicator’s determination.

Background

Brolton was contracted by Hanson to build a quarry processing plant at Bass Point. The parties agreed on a guaranteed maximum price of $85 million (excluding GST) in which Brolton was entitled to claim monthly progress payments on the last Tuesday of each month. Hanson claimed liquidated damages and the contract was eventually terminated on 3 October 2018. In August 2019, Brolton served a payment claim on Hanson. The payment claim claimed work up to September 2018 as well as interest on unpaid amounts to August 2019. The adjudicator determined in favour of Brolton, issuing an adjudication amount of $2,877,052.75. Hanson challenged the decision in the Supreme Court, with the Supreme Court finding in favour of Hanson. This resulted in the appeal by Brolton to the NSW Court of Appeal.

The Court’s decision

Brolton raised two main grounds of appeal. The first and most pertinent issue, concerning jurisdiction, centred predominantly on the availability of a reference date on which Brolton could make its payment claim.
Importance of jurisdiction and the trouble of jurisdictional error
Under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) (SOP Act) section 22, an adjudicator is given the statutory authority to determine the amount of a progress payment, the date on which such amount became payable and the rate of interest payable on any such amount. The importance of section 22 is that it sets out the jurisdiction of an adjudicator. As the saying goes, with great power comes great responsibility. While the adjudicator is given the power to make these determinations, section 22 sets out the limited factors that the adjudicator can consider. These are the responsibility components of the adjudicator’s determination. Two of the relevant factors to consider in Brolton was the provisions of the SOP Act and the payment claim.
While adjudicators are given the power to make determinations, they can only do so in certain circumstances or if there are specified preconditions. In the legal world, this is called a ‘jurisdictional fact’. As Gleeson JA described in Brolton (at paragraph 28), the term jurisdictional fact is used to describe ‘any precondition which a statute requires to exist in order for the decision-maker to embark on the decision-making process’. Jurisdictional facts fall into two types:

1. The existence of an identified state of affairs; or
2. A state of satisfaction of the decision-maker as to an identified state of affairs.

A jurisdictional fact gives a decision-maker the power to make the decision. If it exists, then an adjudicator can make a determination. In this way, the reference date activates the adjudicators powers to make a determination under the SOP Act.
Under the SOP Act, a claimant is only able to make a payment claim when there is a reference date under the construction contract. Therefore, the existence of a reference date is a jurisdictional fact that falls into the first category. This is because the existence or non-existence of a reference date is objective and does not depend on whether the adjudicator is satisfied that a reference date exists. Where an adjudicator exercises its power, but the jurisdictional fact does not actually exist, the adjudicator has made a jurisdictional error..
Getting back to the case, in submitting its payment claim, Brolton claimed in its adjudication submissions that the reference dates for August 2018 and September 2018 were available for the payment claim. Hanson also contended that the September 2018 reference date was available for the progress payment. However, the adjudicator ‘went rogue’ and determined that the reference date was in fact 23 October 2018. There were a few issues with this. Firstly, the 23 October 2018 was not the last Tuesday of the month (which in fact was 30 October 2018). Secondly, the contract had been terminated on 3 October 2018, meaning no further reference dates arose. As the clause entitling Brolton to a progress payment did not continue beyond the termination of the contract, the adjudicator had made a jurisdictional error. The reference date the adjudicator relied on did not exist, and therefore the determination was void and the $2.8 million decision was overturned (as if it had never been made).

Although Hanson succeeded on the first issue, the Court was still minded to consider the second issue on appeal. The second issue concerned the procedural fairness of the adjudicator’s decision. Like jurisdiction, procedural fairness is a legal term that has important consequences for adjudication determinations. Procedural fairness is an aspect of natural justice, a foundational legal principal that sets the standards of how people are to exercise their authority. The concept of procedural fairness means the process in which a decision is made should be just. Procedural fairness requires that parties have the right or opportunity to have their case heard by the decision-maker. If there is a substantial denial of natural justice, the decision-maker’s determination will be void. In this case, the issue of procedural fairness arose because the adjudicator determined that the relevant reference date was a date not submitted by either party. Brolton argued that while procedural fairness was denied to the parties, it was immaterial and should not void the adjudicator’s decision. The Court found that the findings by the adjudicator were a material breach of procedural fairness and therefore there was a breach of natural justice.

Take-away points

While this article has discussed a few technical legal concepts, the main take away points from Brolton are that:
• A progress payment must be linked to a specific reference date. If an adjudicator incorrectly attributes a payment claim to a reference date which does not exist, the determination will be void.
• It is not enough that another reference date is available for the payment claim to be linked to. If the adjudicator goes rogue and determines a reference date not submitted by the parties, the decision will be void.
• Claimants should identify and make it abundantly clear the relevant reference date to which a payment claim relates and make submissions in the adjudication application as to what the relevant reference date is.
• Reference dates are essential for an adjudicator to make a determination. A failure by the adjudicator to appropriately determine a reference date can have dire consequences to claimants.
• Note: The recent amendments to the NSW SOP Act have eliminated the post-termination payment claim issue. Section 13(1C) now states that for construction contracts that have been terminated, a payment claim may be served on and from the date of termination. This change will only apply to contracts entered into after 21 October 2019.

ADR Processes Part II

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This article is Part II of our article on ADR process. In this article, we will be covering the common pitfalls of ADR clauses. In Part I, we discussed the different types of ADR processes that are common in construction law matters. You can find Part I of our article HERE. While there are benefits to ADR processes, the drafting of dispute resolution clauses can sometimes result in the clause being void and unenforceable. Alternatively, there are times where the drafting of the dispute resolution clause means parties are left with a result under the contract which is unfair or unjust in the relevant circumstances. Often dispute resolution clauses are thrown into a contract without the parties giving much thought or consideration as to its enforceability or suitability to the circumstances. The following matters are pitfalls you should consider when you are drafting a dispute resolution clause.

 

Factors that may make the clause void and unenforceable:

 

Precondition to Court or other legal action

 

One of the biggest problems with ADR clauses arises when they set compliance with the ADR process as a pre-condition to seeking any court relief. This is problematic because it attempts to prevent the parties from approaching the Court when it has jurisdiction. If not properly drafted, these types of clauses can make the dispute resolution term unenforceable.

 

Words or phrases to look out for:

 

‘The parties must not seek any court orders until the parties have attended mediation.’

 

Words or phrases that can prevent the clause being unenforceable:

 

‘Nothing in this clause X prevents the parties from seeking urgent or injunctive relief from the Court.’

 

The key difference between these clauses is that the first tries to remove the jurisdiction of the Court by preventing the parties from seeking any relief from the Court until after the ADR processes have been complied with. This can result in some of the parties’ legal rights being wrongly enforced under the contract. For example, in cases where one party seeks to have recourse to security and the other party disputes this, the ADR process mechanisms may be too slow in resolving this dispute. Therefore, it is appropriate for the Court to be able to order urgent or injunctive relief to prevent recourse to the security. The parties can still have the underlying dispute proceed to the elected ADR process, but the security providing party may be able to (in the interim) prevent recourse where it is contested that the other party is not entitled to the benefit of that security.

 

Agreement to agree

 

A dispute resolution clause will be unenforceable if it is void for uncertainty. This often happens when there is an agreement to agree in a clause. For example, if a contract provides that the parties must agree on a matter and the parties are unable to reach an agreement, where do the parties stand in respect of their contractual duties? In the context of a dispute resolution clause, this can occur when the parties are required to agree on the form of the dispute process, or the appropriate body to determine the dispute or the rules that are to be applied to determine the dispute.

 

Words or phrases to look out for:

 

‘The parties must agree on an expert’ or ‘the parties must agree on the form of dispute process’

 

Words or phrases that can prevent the clause being unenforceable:

 

‘The parties must agree on an expert. If the parties cannot agree, the expert shall be appointed or administered by the [for example] Australian Disputes Centre.’

 

The important difference between the two clauses is the second has a mechanism for resolving the uncertainty. If the parties cannot agree on which expert should be appointed, the clause provides for a third party to appoint or determine who the expert will be. Obviously, when nominating a third party to make the decision, it is important to confirm that the third party can and will appoint a dispute resolution professional.

 

Time frames should also be included as part of these clauses to avoid uncertainty. For example, a clause may state that parties are given 14 days to meet together to discuss the dispute before it proceeds to mediation. Without the 14 day timeframe, there is no clear indicator of when the parties are to engage in their dispute resolution process. A deeming mechanism should also be included to account for when the parties simply do not comply with the dispute resolution process. For instance, if the parties do not meet within 14 days, then the dispute should be automatically referred to mediation, or expert determination (as per the next tier of the agreed dispute resolution process) or simply allowed to proceed to litigation.

 

Broad and unclear drafting

 

The last pitfall of dispute resolution clauses discussed in this article is broad and/or unclear drafting. As a general problem with contracts, broad and/or unclear drafting can result in less certainty in the obligations between the parties. In the context of a dispute resolution clause, unclear drafting may occur in any of the following circumstances:

 

  • where there is not a clear process for a dispute to be resolved;
  • where the scope of the ADR powers and what can they determine is not defined;
  • where the rules that guide the ADR process are not clearly referenced; and
  • when can parties appeal the decision.

 

The consequence of broad and/or unclear drafting is that when a dispute arises, further disputes may occur when it comes time to interpret the clause. If a Court considers that the clause is uncertain and is unable to be properly interpreted, it may be held that the clause is void for uncertainty.

 

To assist with some of the considerations that arise with broad or unclear drafting, the next section of this article gives commentary on some of the considerations of ADR clauses so as to ensure your clause is suited to the parties and properly drafted.

 

Important Considerations in ADR clauses

 

Scope of ADR power

 

A dispute resolution clause can be customised by the parties. One way that parties can customise their dispute resolution clause is by determining what types of dispute will be resolved in which ways. For example, the parties may agree that technical matters to do with the scope of works or variations are unsuited to a determination by a legal professional. In such technical matters, the Courts will often have to consider expert reports from both parties, including any updates and responses from the experts. Even after considering the expert reports, the Court may nevertheless be unequipped or unsuitable to determine exactly what the correct outcome is or should be. Methods such as expert appraisal or expert determination can be effective ways of the parties reducing their costs and ensuring an appropriate resolution of the dispute. If this method is agreed by the parties, it is important to clearly set out exactly which disputes are to be resolved in which way. For example, the dispute resolution clause may state that any dispute involving a disputed variation or defective work that hinges on a technical interpretation must be resolved through expert determination. Accordingly, such a clause would also express that any dispute that hinges on legal interpretation be directed to a court of competent jurisdiction.

 

Statutory Provisions

 

When drafting a dispute resolution clause, it is important to consider whether there are any statutory provisions that may impact on the operation of the clause. For example, the Home Building Act 1989 (NSW) prevents the use of arbitration in some contracts for residential building work. In Victoria, the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2002 (VIC) has an intricate regime for claimable variations in high value contracts (being contracts with a consideration over $5,000,000). These statutory provisions can have significant impacts on the clauses chosen by the parties. Further, while the Home Building Act prohibits the use of arbitration, the Victorian Security of Payment Act has consequences for the parties depending on the type of resolution used. It is important then to consider the statutory provisions and what their effects may be.

 

Binding or non-binding

 

A major consideration that parties should think about is whether to have the dispute resolution process as a binding or non-binding method. The Courts have generally held that where parties agree to a binding dispute resolution process, they will be unable to appeal the determination. While there may be circumstances where the parties can appeal to have the determination overturned, as a general rule, parties should expect to be bound by the decision. Therefore, parties should consider when they want to be bound by the decision of the dispute resolution professional.

 

Rights of appeal

 

While the process may be binding, the parties may agree to allow for appeal rights in the dispute resolution clause. For example, the parties may agree that a decision can be appealed where a party claims there has been a manifest error of law or where the amount in dispute exceeds a specified threshold. These mechanisms are interesting ways that parties can customise their dispute process and ensure that they are satisfied with the way any potential disputes will play out. It is important to consider any cost implications with appeal rights. While parties may not wish to be bound by a decision in certain circumstances, appeal rights may inevitably lead to higher costs in resolving a dispute.

 

 

Subcontractor Supporting Statements in the SoPA

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It is commonly understood by participants within the building and construction industry that payment claims made by a head contractor under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW) (SoPA), are to be served with a supporting statement in respect of subcontractors.

The purpose of imposing this obligation on head contractors is clear and simple: to ensure payment of subcontractors is a priority. Ideally, the inherent insolvency risks will be passed ‘up the chain’ to head contractors and ultimately, to the developers who are often better placed to weather the consequences.

But, what happens when the Head Contractor does not comply with their supporting statement requirements under the SoPA? Does the developer still need to pay it?

This question has been the subject of some judicial deliberation, and has been answered with some finality in the recent case of TFM Epping Land Pty Ltd v Decon Australia Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 93.

The Parties

TFM Epping and Katoomba Residence Investments Pty Ltd (TFM), as the developer, engaged Decon Australia Pty Ltd (Decon) as the builder and head contractor to carry out building and construction works on a residential development located at Epping in Sydney’s North West.

The Facts

On 3 June 2019, Decon served on TFM a Progress Claim under the SoPA, seeking approximately $6.4 million (the Claim). The Claim included works carried out throughout project history, for which Decon had not previously been paid.

The supporting statement accompanying the Claim had referenced only one subcontractor that had completed works about 1 year prior to issuing the Claim and specified that the supporting statement applied for works undertaken between 27 June 2018 and 3 July 2018.

TFM did not, within the 10 days prescribed by SoPA, serve a Payment Schedule on Decon, and as a consequence, became liable to pay the full sum sought in the Claim. Payment was not made.

On 3 July 2019 Decon filed a Summons and Notice of Motion in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, both of which sought summary judgment in their favour, for the full amount of the Claim. Shortly after, TFM filed a response, challenging the validity and service of the Claim.

The Decision at First Instance and Issues on Appeal

It was the decision of the Court at first instance that the response filed by TFM did not raise triable issues and to find in favour of Decon. On appeal, TFB sought to challenge this decision.

TFM sought to challenge the decision at first instance on the following 3 grounds:

  1. The Claim was not valid as it had not been accompanied by a supporting statement as required under s13(7) of the SoPA;
  2. The Claim sought payment in respect of variations, which were not performed under the contract and ought to have been claims in quantum meruit; and
  3. The Claim was invalid as it was not made in respect of an available reference date.

The key argument on appeal was that the supporting statement served by Decon was defective for the following reasons:

  • It had not included a ‘list’ of the subcontractors, it had simply given details of one subcontractor; and
  • The dates for which the supporting statement applied did not align with the dates of the works which were the subject of the Claim.

On this Basis, TFM asserted there was an absence of a compliant supporting statement, which rendered the service of the Claim invalid. In the alternative, TFM asserted the Claim itself was invalid.

The Decision on Appeal

The Court found in favour of Decon on all 3 grounds and dismissed TFM’s appeal for the following reasons.

Supporting Statements

The critical document giving rise to the legal right to recover (and obligation to pay) a progress payment, is the payment claim. Despite the wording of s13(7) of the SoPA, the Court determined that it does not attach a condition to the nature or content of the payment claim itself.

In arriving at this Decision, the Court noted that s13(7) of the SoPA included within itself a penalty for parties that did not comply, in terms of a fine. The Court gave significant weight to the purpose of the SoPA, and noted that in circumstances where Parliament has not stated an intended consequence, the Court would be reluctant to imply one.

Variations

The Court found that it could be possible that the variations had not properly arisen under the contract, for example, if some procedural step had not been taken. However, if TFM were of this view, the Court determined it ought to have been raised in a payment schedule. The Court found that including the variation items in the Claim, even if they were disputed, did not render the Claim invalid.

In the present case, Decon had not formulated the variations as a claim for quantum meruit, but rather had stated them to be a claim for work undertaken under the Contract.

Takeaway

This case highlights the fact that the document giving rise to the right to recover (and obligation to pay) a progress payment is the progress claim itself.

A failure to provide a supporting statement in accordance with the SoPA will not invalidate a progress claim. However, head contractors should take a strong note of the reference to the penalty provisions within the SoPA, and should ensure strict compliance with their obligations when serving payment claims for progress payments.

The case also serves as a reminder to respondents that the Court system cannot be used as a ‘second chance’ forum to respond to payment claims. The Court has shown it will not hear matters which should have been raised by way of a payment schedule, and determined in the adjudication system.

As always, preventing problems with your payment claims and payment schedules is much easier (and cheaper) than fixing them. If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice, please contact us on 02 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au.

Letter of Demand 101

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Given the current economic climate, it is important more than ever for a business to ensure that they are able to receive payment for work carried out. This is particularly important for businesses in the construction industry as cashflow is the lifeblood of many construction companies, particularly subcontractors.

If an invoice remains unpaid past the due date for payment, one of the first steps would be to issue a letter of demand.

A letter of demand is a demand to get a third party to do a specific thing, or to cease doing a certain thing. However, in most instances, it is used to seek payment for debts due and payable.

A comprehensive letter of demand for an outstanding debt should include the following:

  1. Details of the arrangement/contract between the parties regarding the debt that is due and payable;

 

  1. Set out the amount owed and why it is owed;

 

  1. Provide a breakdown of the amount owed with any relevant supporting information;

 

  1. Provide a timeframe for the payment to be made, but in most instances should be a minimum of seven days; and

 

  1. The letter should clearly state what could happen if no response and no payment is received e.g. legal proceedings will be commenced.

The letter of demand should provide sufficient detail for the recipient to understand the claim that you have and why you have issued the letter of demand.

It is advisable to include a copy of the outstanding invoice, though it is not necessary. However, the added benefit of including the unpaid invoice is that issuing a letter of demand with the outstanding invoice will also start time ticking pursuant to the Security of Payment Act, in the event that you are entitled to issue a payment claim.

The courts generally do not require a letter of demand to be sent prior to commencing proceedings, however failing to issue a letter of demand prior to commencing proceedings may reduce the amount of legal costs you can claim should you be successful in the proceedings.

Whilst you do not need a lawyer to write a letter of demand, there are a number of benefits in having a lawyer draft and issue a letter of demand on their letterhead. In particular, it gives an indication to the recipient of the letter of demand that you are serious about pursuing the matter, and that you are willing to spend money in legal costs to obtain the item sought in the letter of demand. Further, seeking legal advice prior to issuing a letter of demand may assist you to understand your legal rights, and based on the legal advice, you might find that there are other potential actions or claims that could be pursued against the recipient of the letter of demand.

Bradbury Legal has issued many successful letters of demand in which our clients have obtained payment in full, even for claims exceeding $100,000.00. Though, each response will depend on the position of the recipient.

Once the letter of demand is issued, the recipient can:

  1. pay the money sought in the letter of demand in full;

 

  1. start a dialogue between the parties that could assist in reaching a settlement of the dispute; or

 

  1. not respond or dispute the claim.

 

Should you wish to pursue the matter further if there is no response and no payment received, you could:

  1. commence proceedings in a court or a tribunal; or

 

  1. prepare an adjudication application in accordance with the Security of Payment Act,

depending on your legal rights to do so.

If you require any assistance with any issues regarding debt recovery, or any other disputes which require a letter of demand, feel free to get in contact with Bradbury Legal on 02 9248 3450.

 

Coronavirus (COVID-19) and Construction Contracts: What are your options?

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Coronavirus (COVID19) and the construction industry: What are your options?

We recently published an article about how construction contracts can incorporate concepts of force majeure events. A copy of our article can be found here.

As the disruptions of corona virus begin to become more extensive with government mandates coming into effect, we believe it’s important for those in the construction industry to have a quick reference guide as to their options or important things to think about.

 

Pre-contract: Tendering, negotiating and drafting of contract
Force Majeure clause ·         Manages the relationship between the parties where there has been an ‘Act of God’ or other similar severely disrupting event

·         Depends on the contractual definition of the term

·         Generally, suspends the obligations until the force majeure event has concludes

·         Important to consider when the parties’ obligations will resume – what will indicate the end of the force majeure event
Scope of Works and mitigation of supply chain risk ·         Where possible, alternative supply or materials should be specified in the scope of works with pre-agreed variation prices
Extensions of Time ·         Can include force majeure event as a qualifying cause of delay

·         What circumstances can the contractor or subcontractor seek an EOT?

·         Generally appropriate for an EOT to be granted where there is suspension of works, variation, act, omission or breach of the other party, force majeure events and/or industrial action occurring across the relevant state or territory

·         Are there any duties to mitigate the delay which are a precondition to receiving an EOT
Delay Costs and/or damages ·         Does the contract provide for any delay costs or damages?

·         What are the circumstances that the contractor or subcontractor is entitled to costs and are there any relevant caps?
Legislative Provisions ·         How are the change in legislative requirement provisions worded?

·         Consider the definition of legislative requirement (and/or equivalent and related definitions)

·         Consider whether legislative provisions should include a carve out for where there is a change in the legislative requirements in relation to COVID19. Given the uncertainty around how the government will proceed, it is difficult to predict how the legislative regimes or executive orders will change as the response to COVID changes and adapts
Labour and Key Personnel ·         Are there any key personnel of the contractor or the subcontractor that should be specifically identified?

·         Are there specific measures the Principal/Contractor want to specifically implement? Examples may include split teams
Security ·         Consider what types of security will protect against insolvency risk of contractors or subcontractors – Parent guarantee, retention monies, material security and/or bank guarantees

·         Consider circumstances where there may be recourse to the security such as where a party becomes insolvent or there are defective works that require rectification

·         Consider Principal security for payment if there are any solvency concerns
Insurance ·         Principals should consider whether there are suitable insurance policies to protect from any delays to the works or any consequences that the delays may have at the end of the project

·         For example, Principals may wish to discuss delay in start-up insurance with their insurance broker
Warranty deeds and defects ·         Principals may wish to require warranty deeds from the subcontractors to insure against any insolvency risk from contractors and to allow for any defects to be rectified independent of the contractor
Financial capacity of the tenders ·         When assessing potential contractors, Principals should consider the financial capacity of contractors and whether there are any solvency concerns and if there are any parent companies that can provide guarantees
Project deadlines ·         What deadlines are imposed by related contracts such as sale of land for off the plan properties

·         How long are the deadlines and timeframes of the project? Can they be extended to account for coronavirus
Contract structures ·         Profit/cost-saving sharing models of contract or guaranteed maximum price may be considered by Principals to minimise cost exposure of contracts that may be affected by coronavirus (such as supply chain risk)
Contract administration
Extension of time ·         Principals and Superintendents generally have the power to issue an EOT even when a claim may not be made by the Contractor. While they are not obliged to use this power for the benefit of the contractor, there may be practical and goodwill benefits in using these powers

·         Contractors should seek legal advice in terms of the relevant EOT clause and whether they have a right to seek an EOT or what other options are available to them under the contract
Suspension ·         Suspension is generally a grounds for an EOT

·         Consider who bears the cost of suspension under the contract

·         Is there a right for the contractor to claim any suspension costs or costs associated
Change to legislative requirements ·         In the event of government mandated shutdown, there is likely going to be claims for legislative changes. These will largely depend on the wording of the clauses, who bears the risk on legislative changes and the form of the government shut down

·         Other considerations include whether construction work is considered an essential service and to what extent
Variations ·         Where there is a supply chain breakdown due to closed borders, there may be claims for variations being made by Principals or Contractors to allow the project to continue

·         Variations will be linked to the scope of work and whether there are alternatives that can be sourced
Payments ·         Principals may wish to change payment terms to accommodate contractors or subcontractors

·         As the effects of coronavirus move throughout the economy, there will undoubtedly be businesses that struggle and become insolvent. Where possible, Principals may want to consider changing milestone payments or frequency of payment claims to assist contractors’ cashflows

·         Any agreement between the Principal and relevant contractor should be evidenced in writing
Acceleration ·         If there is relatively small amount of work left, Principals may consider giving directions to accelerate

·         While this may increase the cost of the project, the Principal may be able to ensure the project is completed before shutdowns come into effect
Employment ·         Employment law advice should be sought about how to manage employee relationships while projects are on hold by reason of coronavirus
Teams and social distancing ·         Head contractors may wish to implement policies that flow down the contracting chain in relation to splitting teams and social distancing where possible
Other arrangements agreed between the parties ·         Sometimes the best changes are those made between the parties and not from the lawyers

·         However, even where this is the case, ensure that such agreements are evidenced in writing and you seek legal advice on the impacts of the agreement and whether there are any potential consequences that you may not have considered
Other issues
Financiers ·         In many developments, there may be a financier involved and different obligations that arise under these loans and security documents

·         Principals should consider their obligations to notify their financier(s) where appropriate
Other stakeholders ·         There may be a range of other stakeholders that may have an interest in the construction contracts

·         It is important to manage these aspects of the development to reduce or eliminate any potential problems later on
Dispute resolution
SOPA claims ·         At the time of writing, there have been no changes to the strict deadlines imposed on submitting and responding to payment claims under the NSW Security of Payment legislation

·         SOPA is a contractor friendly forum, allowing for money to flow down the contracting chain

·         SOPA claims can be challenged on jurisdictional grounds or can be settled at the end of the contract if there has been an overpayment
Alternative dispute resolutions ·         Many alternative dispute resolution professionals are not taking new appointments. This can create a delay in parties complying with the relevant dispute resolution clauses

·         Parties may consider teleconferences or videoconferences to resolve disputes, rather than physically meeting
Courts ·         Many courts are operating via videoconferencing, with physical appearances limited

·         The court process may have more delays than usual as judges and parties adjust to the temporary measures of case management

·         Where a party is seeking urgent injunctive or other relief, it is important to seek legal advice as soon as possible to ensure that an application can be made efficiently and protect your interests
Contract termination ·         If you are seeking to terminate the contract it is important to terminate in accordance with the contractual provisions and to consider any common law rights or duties in relation to termination

·         Those seeking to terminate where the counterparty has become insolvent will also need to be aware of the recent insolvency changes and the restrictions on terminating pursuant to insolvency

 

 

What’s in a name?: The Supreme Court Reviews ambiguity in SoPA Payment Claims

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Those who are familiar with the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (‘the Act’) will likely be aware that the provisions it contains are quite strict, and can leave parties out in the cold when they fail to comply with what are seemingly administrative oversights.

However, the overarching purpose of the Act is ultimately to keep money flowing through the construction system, aimed at ensuring those who perform building and construction works, or supply goods and services to construction projects are able to be paid.

The Supreme Court of New South Wales, in the recent decision of decision Modog Pty Ltd v ZS Constructions (Queenscliff) Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1743 reminded parties of this fact when asked to turn its mind to issues of ambiguity in payment claims and whether a party could be allowed to have an adjudication determination quashed on the basis of technicalities.

The Facts

The facts of the case were reasonably clear and did not form a substantial component of the dispute between the parties. In September 2016, Modog Pty Ltd (‘Modog’) entered into a design and construct head contract with Wyndora 36 Pty Ltd (‘Wyndora’) for the development of senior living apartments at a property located along Wyndora Avenue in Freshwater. Modog then entered a sub-contract with ZS Constructions (Queenscliff) Pty Limited (ZS Queenscliff) for the demolition of the existing structure and the construction of the new seniors living complex, including apartments, basement parking and associated site works (‘the Sub-Contract’).

In March 2018, the Sub-contract was varied to engage ZS Queenscliff to provide Construction Management and procurement services, for which ZS Queenscliff would receive a project manager’s allowance, a contract administrator’s allowance and payments for subcontractors and suppliers to be made at the end of each month.

ZS Queenscliff was part of a wider group of entities, which also included ZS Constructions (Australia) Pty Ltd (‘ZS Australia’) and Zaarour Investments Pty Ltd had been engaged as the project manager for the project. Mr Christopher Zaarour was employed by ZS Queenscliff, was the director of ZS Constructions Pty Ltd and was the primary contact with Modog for the duration of the project.

The further sub-contracts on the project were administered by ZS Queenscliff, however invoices from sub-contractors had historically been issued to a mixture of Modog, Wyndora and ZS Australia, as opposed to ZS Queenscliff. During the course of the project, ZS Queenscliff and Modog adopted a progress payments process in which Mr Zaarour would, on behalf of ZS Queenscliff, prepare and email a payment summary sheet listing all amounts due for procurement and management services, as well as materials acquired, and work completed by trade contractors.

On 29 August 2019, Modog issued a Show Cause Notice to ZS Queenscliff and terminated the Sub-contract on 13 September 2019.

The Payment Claim and Adjudication

On 11 September 2019, ZS Queenscliff served a payment claim on Modog which was comprised of seven emails, from Mr Zaarour using an email signature from Zaarour Sleiman and containing a reference to ZS Australia in fine print at the bottom of the email.

The emails attached supporting invoices from suppliers, and followed the process adopted in earlier progress payments, where sub-contractors and suppliers had addressed their invoices to a mixture of the entities involved with the project, and not to ZS Queenscliff, who were issuing the payment claim.

The payment claim served on Modog was, as highlighted by the Court, unclear in the following respects:

  • It did not specifically assert that it was a progress payment claim under the Act;
  • It did not specify the reference date or refer to the clause within the contract upon which the progress payment was based;
  • It failed to ask Modog to pay ZS Queenscliff;
  • It did not include a total for the sum claimed, only determinable by a thorough review of the claims

Modog, in turn responded to the payment claim with payment schedules which certified the amount payable in respect of the Claim was nil.

The matter proceeded to an adjudication, where, on 23 October 2019, the adjudicator found in favour of ZS Queenscliff in the sum of $89,111.89 (GST incl.).

Modog challenged the decision of the adjudicator before the Supreme Court of Sydney, seeking orders that the Adjudication Determination of be deemed void, that the determination be quashed, and ancillary relief.

The Disputed Issues

At the hearing, Modog challenged the decision of the adjudicator on 3 primary grounds:

  • Whether the 11 September 2019 emails constituted a payment claim within the meaning of s13(1) of the Act;
  • If the emails did constitute a payment claim, whether the claim was sent by ZS Queenscliff as a person who was entitled to seek a determination for the purposes of s17 of the Act; and
  • Whether the Adjudicator has committed a jurisdictional error by allowing multiple payment claims in respect of a single reference date?

The Arguments, Decision and Reasoning

Issue 1: Was there a Payment Claim:

The argument advanced by Modog was effectively, ZS Queenscliff had not submitted a valid payment claim as they did not specifically demand payment from Modog (i.e.: did not say, Modog must pay ZS Queenscliff the sum of $X.). Modog relied on the fact that the invoices provided in support of the payment claim, were addressed to various entities, not ZS Queenscliff, and that ZS Queenscliff could not establish they were actually entitled to the money claimed for.

Modog argued that ZS Queenscliff had indicated invoices would be sent at a later time, which Modog was to pay as directed and that, pursuant to the Court’s decision in Quickway Constructions Pty Ltd v Electrical Energy Pty Ltd, ZS Queenscliff had not served a payment claim pursuant to clause 13(1) of the Act.

The counter argument raised by ZS Queenscliff relied upon the case of Icon Co NSW Pty Ltd v Australia Avenue Developments Pty Ltd [2018] to support their position that Modog had simply misunderstood the payment claim, and that this could not be a basis for quashing the adjudicator’s decision. ZS Queenscliff argued the fact that the invoices were addressed to other parties did not invalidate the payment claim as they were simply disbursements to be paid to suppliers.

Ultimately, the Court favoured the position raised by ZS Queenscliff, noting there is nothing within the Act that requires a payment claim to state the total of the sum claimed. The Court stated and that even if the invoices in support of the payment did require Modog to direct payment elsewhere, as long as ZS Queenscliff had an entitlement to the sum under the contract, this did not invalidate the payment claim itself.

Issue 2: Was the Payment Claim Sent by ZS Queenscliff?

Modog then raised the issue that, as the 11 September 2019 email enclosing the payment claim was sent by Mr. Zaarour, using an email signature that did not belong to ZS Queenscliff, and the only legal entity named in the email was ZS Australia, the payment claim had not been served by the appropriate entity for the purposes of s17 of the Act.

The counter argument raised by ZS Queenscliff was that these errors were irrelevant in light of the fact that the previous correspondence between the parties had been exchanged in much the same way, including when detailing the terms of the caries contract agreements, and the point was not taken at the contract negotiation stage.

The Court ultimately agreed again with ZS Queenscliff, making the point that not was not actually disputed that ZS Queenscliff was entitled to make the payment claim and made the determination that the email payment claim had simply been sent by Mr Zaarrour in his capacity as the project manager, on behalf of ZS Queenscliff.

Issue 3: Was there an issue with multiple emails being used to comprise the payment claim?

Finally, Modog sought to raise the point that multiple invoices had been served on them in the emails from ZS Queenscliff and that it was not open for ZS Queenscliff to seek to have all invoices adjudicated.

Relying on the decision of the court in Rail Corporations of NSW v Nebax Constructions [2012] NSWSC6, this point ultimately failed as well, on the basis that, when viewed in the context of the previous conduct between the parties, and the nature of the invoices supplied, Modog had been more accurately provided with one payment claim, and a number of invoices in support of the claim.

What does this decision mean?

This decision serves as a timely reminder to parties that the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (‘the Act’) is intended to allow money to flow through to sub-contractors. Parties should be mindful of this purpose when considering whether to attempt to argue a payment claim on the basis of a minor technicality or ambiguity.

If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice in relation to NSW’s security of payment legislation (or any other state’s or territory’s equivalent), please contact us on (02) 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au.

What’s in a name?: The Supreme Court Reviews ambiguity in SoPA Payment Claims

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Those who are familiar with the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (‘the Act’) will likely be aware that the provisions it contains are quite strict, and can leave parties out in the cold when they fail to comply with what are seemingly administrative oversights.

However, the overarching purpose of the Act is ultimately to keep money flowing through the construction system, aimed at ensuring those who perform building and construction works, or supply goods and services to construction projects are able to be paid.

The Supreme Court of New South Wales, in the recent decision of decision Modog Pty Ltd v ZS Constructions (Queenscliff) Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1743 reminded parties of this fact when asked to turn its mind to issues of ambiguity in payment claims and whether a party could be allowed to have an adjudication determination quashed on the basis of technicalities.

The Facts

The facts of the case were reasonably clear and did not form a substantial component of the dispute between the parties. In September 2016, Modog Pty Ltd (‘Modog’) entered into a design and construct head contract with Wyndora 36 Pty Ltd (‘Wyndora’) for the development of senior living apartments at a property located along Wyndora Avenue in Freshwater. Modog then entered a sub-contract with ZS Constructions (Queenscliff) Pty Limited (ZS Queenscliff) for the demolition of the existing structure and the construction of the new seniors living complex, including apartments, basement parking and associated site works (‘the Sub-Contract’).

In March 2018, the Sub-contract was varied to engage ZS Queenscliff to provide Construction Management and procurement services, for which ZS Queenscliff would receive a project manager’s allowance, a contract administrator’s allowance and payments for subcontractors and suppliers to be made at the end of each month.

ZS Queenscliff was part of a wider group of entities, which also included ZS Constructions (Australia) Pty Ltd (‘ZS Australia’) and Zaarour Investments Pty Ltd had been engaged as the project manager for the project. Mr Christopher Zaarour was employed by ZS Queenscliff, was the director of ZS Constructions Pty Ltd and was the primary contact with Modog for the duration of the project.

The further sub-contracts on the project were administered by ZS Queenscliff, however invoices from sub-contractors had historically been issued to a mixture of Modog, Wyndora and ZS Australia, as opposed to ZS Queenscliff. During the course of the project, ZS Queenscliff and Modog adopted a progress payments process in which Mr Zaarour would, on behalf of ZS Queenscliff, prepare and email a payment summary sheet listing all amounts due for procurement and management services, as well as materials acquired, and work completed by trade contractors.

On 29 August 2019, Modog issued a Show Cause Notice to ZS Queenscliff and terminated the Sub-contract on 13 September 2019.

The Payment Claim and Adjudication

On 11 September 2019, ZS Queenscliff served a payment claim on Modog which was comprised of seven emails, from Mr Zaarour using an email signature from Zaarour Sleiman and containing a reference to ZS Australia in fine print at the bottom of the email.

The emails attached supporting invoices from suppliers, and followed the process adopted in earlier progress payments, where sub-contractors and suppliers had addressed their invoices to a mixture of the entities involved with the project, and not to ZS Queenscliff, who were issuing the payment claim.

The payment claim served on Modog was, as highlighted by the Court, unclear in the following respects:

  • It did not specifically assert that it was a progress payment claim under the Act;
  • It did not specify the reference date or refer to the clause within the contract upon which the progress payment was based;
  • It failed to ask Modog to pay ZS Queenscliff;
  • It did not include a total for the sum claimed, only determinable by a thorough review of the claims

Modog, in turn responded to the payment claim with payment schedules which certified the amount payable in respect of the Claim was nil.

The matter proceeded to an adjudication, where, on 23 October 2019, the adjudicator found in favour of ZS Queenscliff in the sum of $89,111.89 (GST incl.).

Modog challenged the decision of the adjudicator before the Supreme Court of Sydney, seeking orders that the Adjudication Determination of be deemed void, that the determination be quashed, and ancillary relief.

The Disputed Issues

At the hearing, Modog challenged the decision of the adjudicator on 3 primary grounds:

  • Whether the 11 September 2019 emails constituted a payment claim within the meaning of s13(1) of the Act;
  • If the emails did constitute a payment claim, whether the claim was sent by ZS Queenscliff as a person who was entitled to seek a determination for the purposes of s17 of the Act; and
  • Whether the Adjudicator has committed a jurisdictional error by allowing multiple payment claims in respect of a single reference date?

The Arguments, Decision and Reasoning

Issue 1: Was there a Payment Claim:

The argument advanced by Modog was effectively, ZS Queenscliff had not submitted a valid payment claim as they did not specifically demand payment from Modog (i.e.: did not say, Modog must pay ZS Queenscliff the sum of $X.). Modog relied on the fact that the invoices provided in support of the payment claim, were addressed to various entities, not ZS Queenscliff, and that ZS Queenscliff could not establish they were actually entitled to the money claimed for.

Modog argued that ZS Queenscliff had indicated invoices would be sent at a later time, which Modog was to pay as directed and that, pursuant to the Court’s decision in Quickway Constructions Pty Ltd v Electrical Energy Pty Ltd, ZS Queenscliff had not served a payment claim pursuant to clause 13(1) of the Act.

The counter argument raised by ZS Queenscliff relied upon the case of Icon Co NSW Pty Ltd v Australia Avenue Developments Pty Ltd [2018] to support their position that Modog had simply misunderstood the payment claim, and that this could not be a basis for quashing the adjudicator’s decision. ZS Queenscliff argued the fact that the invoices were addressed to other parties did not invalidate the payment claim as they were simply disbursements to be paid to suppliers.

Ultimately, the Court favoured the position raised by ZS Queenscliff, noting there is nothing within the Act that requires a payment claim to state the total of the sum claimed. The Court stated and that even if the invoices in support of the payment did require Modog to direct payment elsewhere, as long as ZS Queenscliff had an entitlement to the sum under the contract, this did not invalidate the payment claim itself.

Issue 2: Was the Payment Claim Sent by ZS Queenscliff?

Modog then raised the issue that, as the 11 September 2019 email enclosing the payment claim was sent by Mr. Zaarour, using an email signature that did not belong to ZS Queenscliff, and the only legal entity named in the email was ZS Australia, the payment claim had not been served by the appropriate entity for the purposes of s17 of the Act.

The counter argument raised by ZS Queenscliff was that these errors were irrelevant in light of the fact that the previous correspondence between the parties had been exchanged in much the same way, including when detailing the terms of the caries contract agreements, and the point was not taken at the contract negotiation stage.

The Court ultimately agreed again with ZS Queenscliff, making the point that not was not actually disputed that ZS Queenscliff was entitled to make the payment claim and made the determination that the email payment claim had simply been sent by Mr Zaarrour in his capacity as the project manager, on behalf of ZS Queenscliff.

Issue 3: Was there an issue with multiple emails being used to comprise the payment claim?

Finally, Modog sought to raise the point that multiple invoices had been served on them in the emails from ZS Queenscliff and that it was not open for ZS Queenscliff to seek to have all invoices adjudicated.

Relying on the decision of the court in Rail Corporations of NSW v Nebax Constructions [2012] NSWSC6, this point ultimately failed as well, on the basis that, when viewed in the context of the previous conduct between the parties, and the nature of the invoices supplied, Modog had been more accurately provided with one payment claim, and a number of invoices in support of the claim.

What does this decision mean?

This decision serves as a timely reminder to parties that the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (‘the Act’) is intended to allow money to flow through to sub-contractors. Parties should be mindful of this purpose when considering whether to attempt to argue a payment claim on the basis of a minor technicality or ambiguity.

If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice in relation to NSW’s security of payment legislation (or any other state’s or territory’s equivalent), please contact us on (02) 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au.

Changes coming in October 2019

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As we have covered in a previous article (see here), 2019 is the year of change for NSW’s security of payment legislation. In November 2018, the NSW Government passed the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Amendment Act 2018, which introduces significant amendments to the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (Act).

In July 2019 it was confirmed that these amendments would commence on 21 October 2019 (rather than in stages as previously speculated) and apply to prospectively to construction contracts entered in into after that date.

A more in-depth explanation of the amendments can be found in our previous article but as a refresher the key amendments to the Act are:

  • Officers from the Department of Finance, Services and Innovation have new powers to investigate, monitor and enforce compliance with the Act;
  • The concept of executive liability has been introduced, exposing directors and management to prosecution if a corporation commits an offence under the Act;
  • Tougher maximum penalties apply, especially in regards to failing to provide a supporting statement;
  • Jurisdictional errors made by adjudicators are reviewable by the Supreme Court (this confirms previous decisions of the courts);
  • Companies in liquidation can no longer serve a payment claim or seek to enforce them;
  • The reference date concept has been removed;
  • Payment claims must again state that they are made under the Act;
  • The due date for payment to subcontractors has been reduced to 20 business days (from 30 business days);
  • Residential owner-occupier exemptions in the Act have been removed; and
  • The threshold for retention moneys that must be held in a trust account has been reduced to $10 million.

What this means for you

As can be seen from the above, these new amendments are significant and wide ranging.  Parties involved in the NSW construction industry have just over one month to consider how these amendments will effect their business and construction contracts before they commence on 21 October 2019.

If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice in relation to NSW’s security of payment legislation, please contact us on +61 (02) 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au.

I Fought the Law and I Won: construction contracts under SOPA

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The New South Wales Supreme Court has delivered a judgment on an issue vital to any construction project: what is a construction contract under the Security of Payment Act (SOP Act)?

The respondent in an adjudication convinced the judge not to follow previous judgments on this point, so it is important that those involved in building stay up to date with this issue.

As the decision was about the unique Security of Payment Act regime, it will not directly apply to situations outside of SOP Act claims.

The ruling targets situations in which there is some understanding between two parties that construction work is to be done in exchange for remuneration, but where there is no clear oral or written contract spelling out the terms.

These cases sit right at the borderline of what the law will enforce and will not enforce. We discuss the case, where it sits among other similar cases, and what we can learn from it.

Case facts

The dispute was between two groups:

  • Timecon Pty Ltd (Timecon) which was the claimant; and
  • The unincorporated joint venture between Lend Lease Engineering Pty Ltd and Bouygues Construction Australia Pty Ltd (LLBJV), which were the respondents.

LLBJV was the principal contractor for the NorthConnex Project, which was constructing two nine kilometre road tunnels linking the M1 to the M2. The project involved excavation and tunnelling, which produces waste known as Virgin Excavated Natural Material (VENM), or “spoil”.

Throughout the project, LLBJV stored 201,700 tonnes of spoil at a site in Somersby, NSW. The site was owned by a company that had the same sole director as Timecon.

Timecon claimed that it entered into a contract or arrangement with LLBJV, for LLBJV to store the waste generated at the NorthConnex project at the Somersby site. Timecon claimed that such an arrangement was for $4.00 per tonne of spoil.

LLBJV claimed that there was no “construction contract”, or else that it had deposited the spoil at the site pursuant to a contract with another party, Laison Earthmoving Pty Ltd (Laison). Laison had been managing the site at the time.

At first instance in adjudication, Timecon had won an adjudication determination in its favour to the tune of $887,532.80 (incl. GST).

In the NSW Supreme Court review of this determination, LLBJV’s main argument was that the adjudicator had no jurisdiction to hear the matter, as there was no “construction contract” between the parties.

Key issues

The key issue was the definition of “construction contract”. The issue is clear cut when there is a written document signed by both parties that are involved in the adjudication, with construction work or goods being the subject matter.

More complicated is the situation in which one party has given to another party some measure of assurance or indication (often only verbal) that it will pay for such goods or services. How do you draw the line between negotiation and a construction contract?

Under the SOP Act in NSW, a construction contract is defined as:

“a contract or other arrangement under which one party undertakes to carry out construction work, or to supply related goods and services, for another party.” (emphasis added)

All States and Territories except Western Australia and Northern Territory use this or a very similar definition, so the decision has wide implications.

Ball J found that before any other SOP Act questions can be asked, every claimant must ask themselves: is the arrangement “a legally binding obligation by which the claimant is entitled to be paid by the respondent for the services the claimant undertakes to provide”? (emphasis added)

The key part here was that to be able to use the SOP Act, there had to be a “legally binding obligation” for the respondent to pay for the work.

This did not necessarily have to be a contract. Though there are not many other examples, one is estoppel which if proven prevents businesspeople from going back on their word, even where there is no actual contract.

For Ball J, the rationale was that if Security of Payment regime could be used even where there was no underlying legal obligation to pay, then in all cases the claimant would have to later return the sum awarded by the adjudicator. His Honour considered that this cannot have been the intention of the SOP Act. It would also be difficult for adjudicators to draw the line between what types of non-legally binding arrangements were to be enforced, and which ones were not.

Back to the case

It was up to Timecon to prove that a contract or other legally enforceable arrangement was in place.

LLBJV and Timecon had exchanged some contractual documents, including a document called “Heads of Agreement” and a draft agreement that was sent “for review”. Both had left the price section blank. Later, LLBJV had even sent an execution copy of an agreement, which Timecon had not signed and returned.

Timecon pointed to a meeting at the Somersby site between a few of the interested parties. During this meeting, the director of Timecon gave the LLBJV representative a Heads of Agreement with the rates left blank. Someone proposed trialling the tipping of 50,000 tonnes of spoil at $4 per tonne.

Unfortunately for Timecon, Ball J was not satisfied with the director of Timecon’s presentation as a witness, as he had failed to address important points in his written evidence and gave evasive answers in person. His version of the meeting was disbelieved.

Moreover, the conduct of the parties subsequent to this meeting was not consistent with there being a legally enforceable arrangement. The director of Timecon had later sent emails asking if LLBJV was still interested in tipping spoil to the site, there had been an unexplained time gap between when an unsigned contract was finalised and when the deliveries of spoil took place.

There was also an issue that Timecon should have known that LLBJV had engaged another party, Laison, to perform the work.

As a separate issue, the tipping of spoil at the site was not construction work. Nor was it supply of related services, as it was not integral to construction work at the NorthConnex project. It was also not a “good”, as it was not a component of the relevant building, structure or work, and was not used in connection with carrying out construction work.

The decision of the adjudicator was void. Timecon walked away with nothing.

Conflicting authority

Unfortunately, this issue of what is a “construction contract” is not done and dusted. We may not know definitively how courts treat this issue until a Court of Appeal rules on this question.

This is because there have been three previous judgments that went the opposite direction and found that an arrangement that is not legally enforceable can still be the subject of adjudication.

Ball J acknowledged these cases, but did not consider them to be “binding”. His Honour’s interpretation was that these cases in fact concerned arrangements that were legal obligations. To the extent that they spoke to hypothetical situations, they were persuasive but not binding.

Upshots

One thing is common to all of these cases. They address the difficult situation in which Party A has made assurances or indications of some description to Party B that it will be paid, but there is no contract. This situation is right at the borders of when the SOP Act can be used and when it cannot be used.

The conflict in authority will make it difficult to predict how cases in the near future will end up. However, regardless of how the law is ultimately decided, there are a number of things that developers and builders can learn from Timecon v Lendlease Engineering to avoid being in this grey area.

The first regret of Timecon will be assuming that contractual documents will be “sorted” down the line. It had a chance to sign and return the contractual documents but failed to do so. This was apparently because it still had to test the capacities of the site to take spoil. However, this non-response led LLBJV to look elsewhere and no contract was signed.

Timecon’s failure to seal the deal or at least keep negotiations going was largely why it did not get the result it wanted. Do not let the agreement or understanding lapse and make it binding as soon as possible.

Further, Timecon should have documented everything. Numerous times, Ball J preferred LLBJV’s version of events thanks to other evidence corroborating their account. In other cases, where claimants have written records of their meetings with respondents, or contemporaneous emails that are consistent with their story, they have been able to convince judges that representations had been made to them about payment.

Being scrupulous about these will ensure that builders and contractors avoid the expensive and difficult-to-predict process of litigation.

If you or someone you know wants more information or needs help or advice, please contact us on +61 (2) 9248 3450 or email info@bradburylegal.com.au.